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An Empirical Analysis of Debt/GDP+ Ratios 
Lucas Po 
 
Abstract 
This thesis reviews past works that measured separately how public debt and private debt and 
household debt specifically affects GDP growth for both advanced and emerging economies for 
years generally up to 2009. This paper is meant to continue these analyses and update results for 
the years 2010-2015. This paper incorporates different factors including population, investment 
and dummy variables considered from each previous work as well as the some of the econometric 
analytical frameworks used. After conducting successful robustness checks, this paper concluded 
that private debt is beneficial to GDP growth in advanced countries once debt surpasses 120 
percent of a country’s GDP. It can’t be concluded, however, that increases in public debt, 
household debt or population will continue to harm growth when either of these debt types reach 
past 90 percent of GDP due to insignificant results being calculated. It can be concluded, however, 
that public debt will cause inflation to decline when public debt is above 120 percent of GDP.  
 
 
Section I: Introduction 
How does public debt, as well as private and household debt, effect GDP growth in current 
times? How does public debt affect other factors such as inflation? The speculations regarding the 
inverse relationship between public debt and GDP growth continue to ponder economists since the 
early 21st century, especially determining which certain rates of public debt exceeding percentages 
of GDP would be more detrimental. Before and during the Great Recession, different economists 
and IMF researchers argued different levels of debt would lead to different growth rates. 
Many scholarly papers generally arrive at the same conclusion of public debt negatively 
affecting growth in the short and long run to both advanced and emerging markets. Because of 
their formula differences, however, they conclude with different amounts of public debt that would 
lead to significant declines in growth for advanced and emerging economies. However, to focus 
only on public debt affecting growth obscures economic thought. Private debt has played an 
important role in analyzing debt levels of private entities/nonfinancial corporations. Economists 
have also analyzed empirically the negative impacts of private debt and household on GDP growth, 
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using different analytical methodologies. Generally, they all concluded that private debt and 
household debt fundamentally damage GDP growth for both advanced and emerging markets in 
the long run. Growth isn’t the only factor at risk when both debts increase. Economists have also 
concluded that public debt policies that lead to increasing deficits will in turn stimulate inflation 
rates to levels unnecessary for a country’s growth. This ultimately reveals as public and private 
debt continues to increase, factors such as GDP growth and inflation will suffer as a result. These 
papers, however, all conduct their own research focusing on only of the two debt types but rarely 
both. These papers also only focus on their effects on one or few select factors such as growth. 
The purpose of this paper is to review and update the works of some of these economists 
regarding growth and the different debt types. This thesis will conduct its own analysis on how 
harmful public debt is to growth for both advanced and non-advanced countries. This thesis will 
conduct the same analysis for both private debt and household debt and their effects on GDP. 
Similar regressions will be conducted regarding the relationships between public debt and 
inflation. This paper will also consider factors such as increases/decreases in investment, 
population increases/decreases in formal models depicting the effects of the different debt types 
on GDP growth. By analyzing the different methodologies conducted by the different researchers, 
specific econometric analyses will be considered and used to determine these relationships.  Like 
many previous papers, this paper will take into account that advanced and non-advanced countries 
don’t possess the same economic strengths/weaknesses and will have to be calculated at different 
standards.  
The contributions to this work are to consider both public and private debt in one thesis as 
opposed to most researchers focusing on only one type of debt and how it affects growth. This 
paper will use econometric work and analysis. Few of the past works noted in this thesis based 
their work on analyzing historical data series. As stated, many of these papers conducted this 
research considering many years up to 2009; very few papers analyzed debt and growth after the 
Great Recession and the eurozone crisis. This paper understands that these two economic events 
caused debt levels to increase significantly to levels that may have been precedented by the 
previous papers. Each previous economist engaged in this argument applied different formulas and 
statistical techniques to reach their conclusions, such as imputing public debt and other factors 
such as population and investment as linear model while others prefer implicating polynomial 
equations. Also, some econometricians created groups for the different debt levels and determine 
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how each group impacted growth. Other econometricians did analyze debt levels up to 2017 but 
included original econometric methods to achieve their results. This work will focus more on 
developing simple linear and quadratic equations to answer these questions and construct graphs 
to determine the different slopes in growth rates when debts increase. 
The robustness checks conducted in this paper proved the data and variables are BLUE 
according to the Gauss Marko Theorem. This paper concluded that increasing private debt could 
stimulate GDP growth in advanced countries if it continues to increase to significant levels. It 
couldn’t be concluded, however, that increases in public debt, household debt or population will 
harm growth when either of these debt types increase to extreme levels due to the statistically 
insignificant results that emerged. From this paper, public debt will cause inflation to decline when 
public debt reaches substantial levels. 
Section II reviews the literature. Section III discusses the data collected and the linear 
econometric models developed. Section IV analyzes the robustness checks conducted on the linear 
models to endure the dataset and variables aren’t biased in any way. Section V discusses the results 
that emerged from regressing the linear models and addresses the introduction of the quadratic 
models. Section VI revisits the robustness checks after the polynomial models were presented in 
this paper. Section VII discusses the final results of the polynomial regressions and considers the 
limitations in the analytical work that could have caused the results to appear as they did. Section 
VIII concludes with a discussion on future research possibilities.  
 
 
Section II: Literature Review 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze fiscal policies and their impacts on economic 
growth and inflation. However, analyzing GDP growth and its relationship when a country’s public 
debt increases takes priority in this thesis. There are two papers that discuss the relationship 
between public debt, GDP growth and inflation. The first paper discussed a [slightly] inverted 
relationship between public debt and GDP growth between multiple countries while the second 
replicated the research but discovered a different relationship and discussed the errors of the first 
paper. These two papers serve as the core literatures review for this thesis, with each referencing 
numerous papers in their research. The data they use dates back from 1916 to 2009. Another paper 
discusses public debt and growth in 2010. Hopefully, these papers will be deciphered to conduct a 
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separate research on the relationship between public debt and GDP growth during and after 2010 
and update the theses outlined by these literatures. To go a step further than these two literatures, 
the other kinds of debt, including private and household debt, will be investigated and their 
relationships against GDP growth will be analyzed. 
Public debt is mainly defined as government expenditures with spending exceeding 
taxation. The fiscal policies made by countries to spend its income at a greater rate than receiving 
revenue via taxation is an epidemic many countries have faced since World War I.  Economic 
Professor Robert J. Barro has written many papers focusing on the theory of public debt and 
notable shifts in the rate of public debt throughout time, as well as the causes for these shifts. One 
of his research papers theorized how the government should monopolize in producing bond 
“liquidity services” to have public debt issue increase net wealth (thus, reduce government debt) 
rather than [imperfect] private capital markets. This discovery then helped Barro conclude that 
uncertainty in tax liabilities leads to the issue of public debt more likely risking household balance 
sheets and household wealth to be compromised. Citation: Barro (1974). GDP is a good 
measurement of a country’s wealth and economic state. If household wealth faces risk of being 
compromised when public debt accelerates, what would become of GDP growth and inflation in 
that country? This research is, of course, is outdated as this paper expressed fear during the 1970s. 
The global economy has much evolved since then and while public debt continues to increase for 
many countries, GDP growth and household wealth has gradually increased at the same time for 
developed countries at least. Citation: Federal Reserve of Economic Data (2019). Papers detailing 
the empirical relationship between GDP growth and public debt have been constructed since then 
by specialists, showing that there was no immediate threat to GDP and wealth by rising public 
debt. 
Researchers Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff analyzed fiscal policies relating 
to government expenditure and increasing debt. They have studied the public debt, including 
external debts for these countries, GDP growth, and inflation of 44 countries and measured 
changes in debt/GDP ratio when public debt increases. They find that when a country’s debt is 
above a threshold of 90 percent of GDP, the growth rates decline by about one percent. When the 
threshold is below 90 percent, the relationship is weak. Citation: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). This 
paper also concluded that for emerging markets, when the threshold was 60 percent, annual GDP 
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growth rates fall by approximately two percent. When debts were higher percentages of GDP, 
growth declines at half the rate. Citation: Reinhart & Rogoff (2010).  
Another discovery from this paper is that while GDP growth deteriorates when public debt 
increases, there seems to be no clear relationship between inflation and public debt. The US alone 
faced high inflation when debt/GDP was high. However, when developed countries are grouped 
together, their high public debts don’t directly lead to higher or lower levels of inflation. On the 
other side, when emerging markets experiences high levels of debt, inflation rises in a similar 
pattern. Citation: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Inflation remains indifferent for developed countries 
when their debts rise or fall each year. This should make some sense as it rather monetary policies 
(specifically money supply) that control the growth rate of inflation for a developed country. 
Overall, this paper seemed to have definitively proven that when a developed country increases its 
deficit annually, its economic growth rate decreases at a slower rate, indicating that a higher 
debt/GDP ratio is healthy for its economy (and vice versa for a developing country). This argument 
would gain many supporters until they read updated papers on the same topic that illustrates flaws 
made by Reinhart and Rogoff. 
While there was [some] empirical evidence that public debt seemed to have a negative 
relationship with GDP growth, there was still skepticism in the theory that public debt being 90 
percent of a country’s GDP would lead to a fall in overall economic growth. John Irons and Josh 
Bivens illustrated the lack of theory or data that supports this claim for the United States. They 
even went as far to explain that economic growth is at most risk when policymakers fail to act out 
of fear of facing higher deficits. Citation: Irons and Bivens (2010). Markets in almost every 
[developed] economy despise uncertainty and it is this lack of uncertainty that cause fear and value 
of stocks to fall. No major decision could be made, due the overwhelming fear of facing any 
potential repercussion. It is then when economic growth might start to decline. Irons and Bivens 
exquisitely explained that while impeding high deficits should be noted, there would still be no 
alarming point that the global economy would commence to decline for the worst. 
It was impressive initially with the detailed analytical research Reinhart and Rogoff 
conducted on debt/GDP ratio. However, it was then discovered that Reinhart and Rogoff selected 
exclusive data to support their conclusions. They also conducted coding errors and weighted 
summary statistics improperly. Analysts Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin 
reviewed Reinhart and Rogoff’s paper and undercut their methodology of measuring debt/GDP 
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ratio, claiming that their mistakes led to horrible miscalculations and misrepresentations of the 
relationship between public debt and GDP growth. Reinhart and Rogoff based their data 
collections of different countries and different periods of time on public debt/GDP ratios for each 
country. When they collated their data in this manner, non-linear relationships between GDP 
growth and public debt were revealed. Citation: Herndon et. al. (2014). These analysts gained 
access to Reinhart and Rogoff’s working spreadsheet and were able to approximate closely the 
published results, leading them to discover the errors of the previous paper. These analysts 
replicated what Reinhart and Rogoff conducted using the same data, except this time they filled in 
the time gaps that were previously excluded, they included countries that were previously 
excluded, and they start to use a weighting methodology of one observation per country. They 
focused their research on a country’s debt levels that exceed 90 percent of its GDP. They 
determined that GDP growth increases by about 2.2 percent in advancing economies. This seems 
more in line with the macroeconomic theory outlined earlier. They take into consideration that not 
every country has the same economic state and states vary over the period of time.  
Ash and Pollin have taken an additional step and published a supplementary article 
critiquing the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff and their methodology. They start off by explaining 
in detail the coding errors made by Reinhart and Rogoff that led them to serious miscalculations 
in their measurements and that they even [unintentionally] excluded Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada and Denmark from their research. RR’s coding errors for calculating the median for certain 
lines in cells resulted in GDP growth declining by -0.3 percentage points in their public debt/GDP 
category of 90 percent and above. Citation: Ash and Pollin (2011). This miscalculation alone 
inflated the inverse relationship between GDP growth and public debt by 0.6 percentage points 
when computing medians. Citation: Ash and Pollin (2013). This paper explains how crucial it is 
to input data codes carefully as mistakes like this results in horrible miscalculations for a thesis. It 
might not have been deliberate for Reinhart and Rogoff to make mistakes as such. Nevertheless, 
their oversights cost them severely and led them to construct a thesis with various holes in their 
research. The data must be collated carefully to conduct future theses related to this topic.  
As Ash and Pollin explained Reinhart and Rogoff’s methodology with skepticism, they 
continued RR’s research by adding more categories in their regression analysis; Ash and Pollin 
added a category where public debt was between 90 and 120 percent of a country’s GDP and 
another category where public debt exceeded 120 percent of GDP. This decision revealed that 
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GDP growth is still positive in the face of high public debt, albeit at a lower rate. When public 
debt was between 90 and 120 percent of GDP, the growth rate of average real GDP was 2.5 percent, 
yielding the same results as the 60-90 percent bracket. When public debt surpassed 120 percent of 
GDP, average growth was 1.6 percent. Citation: Ash and Pollin (2013). This analysis led Ash and 
Pollin to rebuff Reinhart and Rogoff’s claim that there is a decline in GDP growth when public 
debt/GDP ratio is 90 percent. After reaching to this conclusion, Ash and Pollin investigated the 
relationship between public debt and GDP growth during the 21st century in much more detail. 
They determined that GDP growth increased when public debt was above 90 percent of GDP 
compared to the 60-90 percent public debt/GDP category. The relationship between these two 
variables might be weaker when comparing more recent data to earlier data. Citation: Ash and 
Pollin (2013). 
Interestingly, Ash and Pollin did not note the Great Recession in their paper and how this 
could have prejudiced their data and results. Could this have been an overstep in their analysis, or 
did the Great Recession truly not shock the relationship between public debt and GDP. This would 
be surprising as the Great Recession had a significant impact on inflation for most countries, which 
could have sparked a new relationship between this and public debt. Perhaps that relationship 
could, in turn, have influenced Ash and Pollin’s results and illustrate a different relationship 
between public debt and GDP growth during the 21st century.  
The literatures written above discuss public debt and its effects on GDP growth and wealth 
for the last few decades. They do not, however, explain the recent changes in fiscal policy after 
the Great Recession. Many countries were hit significantly by the financial crises and thus, had to 
develop different policies to fight and recover from this recession. Economists have come to an 
agreement that increases in deficits are allowable during a recession if and only if they are followed 
by increases in surpluses during booms. Citation: Alesina (2012). Certain countries, however, took 
different approaches on how to control these increases in deficits/surpluses during economic 
periods. Particularly, economists debate whether it’s more effective to reduce taxation or increase 
government spending. Citation: Alesina (2012). Alberto Alesina explains here that economists 
dispute over how to increase public debt for the betterment of a country. Alesina interestingly 
claimed that if a country were to reduce interest rates and first cut spending, taxes would be cut in 
the near future, boosting consumption, investment and labor supply. This in turn would build GDP 
growth through a recession. This fiscal decision mapped out by Alesina reveals a potential scenario 
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in which it would actually be cost effective to control government spending before government 
revenue. Compared to the tax side, this adjustment on the spending side is significantly less 
expensive. Citation: Alesina (2012). The US controlled its spending by raising and lowering 
government expenditures in certain quarters. Citation: FRED (2019). This in turn led to lower tax 
receipts in the US and thus, it was able to better recover compared to European countries, many of 
which launched austerity policies and reduced government spending while raising taxes. This 
decision, unfortunately, contributed to many European countries facing the eurozone debt crisis 
after the Great Recession.  
As countries had to revise their strategies on fiscal policies to respond to the financial crisis, 
public debt levels in turn have changed after these policy adjustments. At the same time, GDP 
growth altered significantly within countries. In the US alone, real GDP growth has rapidly 
fluctuated between years after 2010 to 2018, Citation: IMF (2019), indicating new trends on GDP 
growth. If the theses by RR and Herndon were tested now with this recent development, would 
there be a new relationship between public debt and GDP growth? As different countries enforced 
different fiscal policies, would their debt/GDP ratios be different despite both achieving higher 
public debt? The US and European countries imposed diverse fiscal policies that resulted in very 
different economic outcomes. This new data could also empirically reveal which fiscal policies 
are better suited for times of financial crises and which policy would lead to higher GDP growth. 
It wasn’t until 2011 that Reinhart and Rogoff decided to examine public debt and GDP 
further during the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff decided to 
expand their thinking and examine private debt as well as public debt to illustrate the escalating 
banking crisis within each country. The banking sectors faced huge amounts of private debt and 
that the convergence of private to debt to public debt would not stop. Citation: Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011). The Reinhart and Rogoff examined how private debts from private sector banks soared 
and became public and how this contributed to many countries facing the sovereign debt crisis. 
They revealed foreboding information that higher debts lead to lower economic growth, and that 
they lack evidence to suggest that the United States is equally as susceptible as other developed 
countries when facing high debt. Citation: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). It is not surprising here to 
see that Reinhart and Rogoff arrived at conclusions that are linear to those outlines in their previous 
papers. Reinhart and Rogoff, once again, took a detailed analytical approach to examine the 
relationship between rising public debt and GDP growth. However, remembering that Reinhart 
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and Rogoff conducted their previous analyses improperly, it is hard to side with these two 
economists and conclude that high levels of debt leads to certain decline in GDP. What would 
Herndon, Ash and Pollin think of this paper? If they try to analyze public and private debt and 
GDP growth from 1916 to 2010 using their method, would they reveal alternative relationships? 
It is curious to examine changes in other forms of debt (private, household, etc.) before and after 
the Great Recession and reveal any information regarding their relationships with GDP growth.  
While Reinhart and Rogoff and Herndon, Ash and Pollin conducted Debt/GDP ratio 
testing, IMF researchers Kumar and Woo decided to analyze the effects of public debt on growth 
as well. However, Kumar and Woo decided to conduct this experiment using econometric analysis 
and consider other factors such as investment, labor productivity, population human capital, 
government consumption share of GDP, net exports, inflation and trade rates. They build non-
linear models using data of these factors for 38 countries for the years 1970-2008. They conduct 
robustness checks to ensure their estimations weren’t biased. They constructed dummy variables 
for advanced and emerging economies and three dummy variables to classify different levels of 
public debt: Dum_30 for public debt below 30 percent of GDP, Dum_30-90 for debt between 30 
and 90 percent of GDP and Dum_90 for debt over 90 percent of GDP. This econometric method 
led Kumar and Woo to conclude that public debt begins to affect growth negatively when public 
debt reaches to 90 percent of GDP. A ten-percentage point increase would lead to growth slowing 
to 0.2 percentage points each year for emerging economies and 0.15 percentage points for 
advanced countries. Over 90 percent of public debt would result in even lower growth results. 
They concluded this for both advanced and emerging economies with emerging economies 
suffering greater than advanced economies. They also concluded that debt leads to slower 
investment which in turn leads to lower labor productivity. Kumar and Woo proceeded to write a 
similar econometric paper in 2015 in reaction to the increasing public debt levels for many 
countries. However, this work is not easily accessible to the general public. It is insightful how 
Kumar and Woo developed dummy variables for the different debt levels to get accurate results of 
how much debt would lead to lower growth. This method would ideally be considered and used 
when analyzing both public and private debt in this thesis, as well as the variables of investment 
and population.  
These papers analyze excruciatingly the positive/negative relationships between GDP 
growth and public debt. However, what makes their arguments narrow-minded is that they 
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exclusively discuss only the relationship with public debt and GDP growth. None of these papers 
discuss the direct relationship between GDP growth and private or household debt. Would there 
be a different relationship if private debt was considered as opposed to public debt? It is compelling 
to test if the relationships would be the same if private debt/GDP ratio were to be measured.  
More literatures pertaining to private and household debts and their impact on the 
American economy came to light. The first two papers, both written by economist Steve Keen, 
discusses how private and household debts have continued to rise to levels that exceed those that 
led America to face the Great Depression. Citation: Keen (2009). Keen believed that high private 
and household debt levels will contribute to America facing a devastating economic recession. In 
both of his papers he looked at private debt levels and growth data in the United States and 
Australia with years dating back from 1860 until the start of banking crisis in 2007. In his first 
paper, he constructed a model of measuring output and employment. It expressed how the financial 
system lends the maximum capacity of credit debt business and households can accept. Citation: 
Keen (2009). The different factors that could contribute to private debt (loans, prices, wages and 
payments, for instance) were plugged as both exogenous and endogenous variables to show how 
private debt increased. As private debts continued to increase, output and employment fell 
dramatically in the U.S. and if private debt is not reduced, the United States could face another 
Great Depression. Citation: Keen (2009).  
In Keen’s second paper, written shortly after his initial analytical works, he expands his 
model to incorporate Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”, specifically discussing the 
theory of borrowing money to fund ‘Ponzi’ speculation on asset prices. This procured the growth 
of the household debt in the U.S. starting from 1990. This addition to his model led Keen to observe 
private debt increasing further and the threat of economic collapse would be even more serious. 
Keen believes that a collapse would have occurred in 1987 with minimal effects. However, this 
recession was delayed by the government intervening, causing private debt levels to rise 
continuously which would result in a cataclysmic collapse in the future. Since the government 
intervened in 1987, this depression was postponed, and a catastrophic depression occurred at the 
time of this paper’s publication. It seemed that Keen was partially correct in that the Great 
Recession did occur, but it did not possess as destructive effects as the Great Depression, despite 
private and household debts being higher. Perhaps, since private and household debts are higher 
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now compared to when this paper was written, these two forms of debt will contribute to shortening 
GDP growth and another recession may occur, but this will not happen for some time.  
The second paper, composed by researchers Lombardi, Mohanty and Shim, discusses both 
the short and long run impact of household debt and GDP growth. They concluded that more 
household debt is beneficial for advanced economies in the short run but harmful in the long run; 
for emerging markets increasing household debt is always negative for growth. Citation: Lombardi 
et al. (2017). They examine this using both simple and complex STATA regression formulas, 
including an original empirical approach. This thesis, however, will use more/different countries 
in the dataset and other factors including population and investment will be included in this 
analysis. Dummy variables will be developed for the different private and household debt levels. 
Although Herndon, Ash and Pollin decided not to replicate/correct Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
experiment on public debt affecting inflation, other papers claimed that high deficits contribute to 
high inflation. Monetary advisor Preston J. Miller explains in his works as simply as possible that 
deficits are equated as money created combines with net private bond sales, or the rise of its 
money’s value and bonds that are held in the private sector. Citation: Miller (1983). Miller goes 
on to examine the current and future deficits of his time to determine if the government would be 
able to continue funding public debt or face insolvency. Miller decided to look at an economic 
period where growth occurred smoothly/consistently with no rapid stimulus/decline. Deriving 
formulas to determine a simple equation of government spending – taxation (both being constant 
proportions of real output), he attempts to predict inflation when these two factors lead to 
consistent increase in deficit. Miller recalls a legal restrictions theory and considers three causes 
for higher deficits leading to higher inflation: when the Federal Reserve monetizes the deficits by 
accommodating increases in money and bonds to prevent interest rates increasing to levels that 
would cause the government to face insolvency. Thus, lowering the interest rate would be essential 
here, meaning inflation would rise. Citation: Miller (1983).  
Another cause for high inflation is when crowding out occurs. With decreasing returns to 
capital (resulting from more bonds being sold to private investors in the open market), real output 
begins to decline while real rate of interest would rise, leading to higher prices or inflation. 
Citation: Miller (1983). Finally, when deficits rise, private sectors would be inclines to privately 
monetize government debt. This would cause private corporations to evade legal restrictions by 
holding government bonds as opposed to money out desire to maximize profits. Citation: Miller 
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(1983). These firms would use bonds for spending instead of money and increase inflation. Deficit 
and public debt are related to each other in the sense that the government generates public debt by 
borrowing money to compensate for years of deficit. This relation can be used to conclude that 
increases in public debt would in turn lead to higher inflation. Of course, this theory was developed 
30 years prior to the years considered in this thesis. Public debt and deficit have increased since 
then for almost every country considered in this thesis. However, the fundamental theorem of 
deficits causing more inflation would remain intact; economic activity continued to grow at a 
consistent rate for many countries except for those who fell victim to the Great Recession as well 
as the sovereign debt crisis. The latter crisis, however resulted in few European countries facing 
rapid increases in public and private debts; this didn’t affect every major country. 
The years studied in this thesis are particularly notable as they were the years after the 
Great Recession. Major countries such as the US and many eurozone countries faced crashing 
markets that began with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the US, eventually 
developing into a complete international banking crisis. This crisis was transformed into the global 
economic decline infamously known as the Great Recession, followed by a crisis in the banking 
system of the European countries using the euro. Many countries were still facing the repercussions 
of the financial crisis years after, such as Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. They attempted to 
fix their public debts by implementing austerity policies including cutting government spending 
and/or increasing taxation. Citation: Mckee et. al (2014). This decision, however, backfired on 
these countries and they fell into a second financial crisis deemed as the sovereign debt crisis or 
the eurozone crisis.  
For some eurozone countries, in Spain’s case especially, the economic effects of the crisis 
seemed worse compared to the rest of the Eurozone. Due to a high amount of liabilities of 
businesses and households, Spain’s main problems stemmed from high private debt. Spain’s 
increasing rate in the private sector’s debt was five times larger than that of the Eurozone.  
Some of the Spanish banks, such as ES, had 155,175 million euros exposed to the sovereign 
debt crisis. European countries such as Germany, Belgium and France had big IB banks that were 
most exposed to Spain as well as Italy. Citation: Blundell-Wignall (2012). Prices of Spain’s 
securities oscillated, which negatively affected collateral values.  The solvency of Spain’s banks 
was brought into question and its inability to meet collateral calls lead to a liquidity crisis; the 
Spanish banks were unable to recapitalize through earnings in a timely manner. Citation: Blundell-
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Wignall (2012). Private debt levels reached to a record of 215.98 percent of GDP in Spain in 2010. 
While private levels slowly decreased to almost 175 percent of GDP, growth continued to decline 
until 2013 when it increased -1.7 to 3.6 by 2015. This supports the theory of private debt negatively 
affecting GDP according to Keen. Citation: Keen (2009). During this time, public debt continued 
to increase which seemed irrelevant as it did almost nothing to help increase growth in Spain. At 
the end of 2010, Spain’s public debt amounted to 60.1 percent of its national GDP, which was 25 
percentage points lower than the Eurozone’s average [which was 85.1 percent at the time]. 
Citation: Carballo-Cruz (2011). These countries are considered as “advanced” by the International 
Monetary Fund, yet they have produced enough private debt levels that were actually detrimental 
to their GDP growth despite public debt increasing concurrently. This will have to be considered 
when calculating the magnitude of the impact public debt has on GDP; even though it may rise, 
GDP might still fall due to the rise in private debt for “advanced” economies such as Spain. 
After the Great Recession, except for Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Israel, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland, almost every major country included in this thesis was split 
between facing escalated public and private debts or seeing rapid declines in these factors. During 
this time, GDP growth continued to decrease for many European countries. Citation: Carballo-
Cruz (2011). By observing the data, countries such as the US faced a period where GDP growth 
fluctuated between 2.6 to 1.6 percent GDP growth and finally settled to 2.9 percent in 2015. At 
the same time, however, public debt continued to rise from around 95 percent to almost 105 percent 
of its GDP. Private declined from 158 percent to 147 percent (over 10 percent) while household 
debt similarly declined from 91 percent to almost 78 (almost 20 percent decrease). This also seems 
to be in contrast with the economic works of Herndon, Ash and Pollin where they proved that 
advanced economies facing higher levels of government debt would stimulate growth for their 
country. Citation: Herndon et. al. (2014). It’s also been outlined earlier that both private and 
household debt possess negative effects for GDP growth. The data for the US show that the country 
entered in an economic period after the financial crisis where the specific levels of debt that were 
increasing/decreasing would result in constant growth in GDP. All of these debts should curve the 
US economy into a state of continuous growth, yet this is not the case. Some economists theorize 
that employment began to stagger due to a slow in growth in education attainment; this would 
mark the beginning of growth gradually deteriorating in the long run. Citation: Fernald and Jones 
(2014). 
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The financial crisis began in the United States, but it migrated towards Europe due to 
Europe’s investment in the US mortgage market. European countries, including Spain, began 
overinvesting in US mortgage-backed securities that were based on valuations of risky mortgages, 
which were ultimately poorly [and fraudulently] administered. Citation: Karanikolos et. al. (2013). 
As a result, an inevitable rise in US interest rates led to borrower defaults and then to bank defaults. 
This chain reaction initiated the start of the crash in the housing and stock markets. The value of 
US mortgage-backed securities plunged, leading to the collapse of the US housing market. 
However, because many of these mortgage-backed securities were sold in Europe, the collapse in 
the US housing market quickly affected European banks, including Spain’s. Citation: Karanikolos 
et. al. (2013). This led to a domino effect between each national economy until it resulted into an 
international economic disaster. 
While debt levels are shifting to quantities that should bolster/hinder economic growth in 
the US, the data for this thesis shows fluctuations with GDP growth. Researchers John G. Fernald 
and Charles I. Jones began analyzing a model equating new ideas emerging for research and 
business. This model takes output per person, education attainment and stock of ideas which is 
“inferred” from the “flow” of investment (ie population and the strength of research) as well as 
other factors into consideration. In the years between 1950 and 2007, the main factor driving the 
development of new ideas is education attainment whereas the other factors remained constant. 
Citation: Fernald and Jones (2014). Fernald and Jones classified this dataset as education 
attainment by birth cohort and observe that the slope of education attainment is getting flatter, 
signifying reduced contribution from this factor. With all other factors staying constant, GDP 
growth might decline as a result in the decline of education attainment. This factor will not be used 
in the regressions but could be used in future theses regarding debt and growth. Similarly, Fernald 
and Jones argue that population is increasing at slower rates compared to historical increases, 
leading to slower growth in the United States. Should population have a constant positive 
relationship with GDP growth? In the years analyzed in this thesis, population grows/declines in 
dissimilar patterns as GDP growth for both advanced and non-advanced countries. However, this 
is only true for the six years in this dataset; this does not reflect the overall growths in population 
and GDP growth for the past 140 years. This does not necessarily mean that population no longer 
has a linear relationship with GDP growth. This will have to be taken into account when 
conducting the regression on this relationship. 
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After reading these literatures, the data used in these papers (or relatable data) should 
ideally be used in this thesis and this thesis should ideally be simply updated using more recent 
data released after the Great Recession. I need to replicate (to the best of my availability) the 
research done by Reinhart and Rogoff with updated data and repeat the analytical framework of 
Herndon, Ash and Pollin and determine which argument holds for the developed and emerging 
markets. I can test the relationship between GDP growth and public debt, as well as private debt 
and household debt. What relationship do these types of debt have with inflation? Will it be similar 
to public debt or will my analyses reveal new relationship information? Only then will the 
relationship between debt/GDP ratio and unemployment and contribute further in this thesis. 
 
 
Section III: Analytical Framework and Initial Models Developed 
What was very peculiar for Reinhart and Rogoff was that they based their analysis on 
examining historical data series. They said they calculated public debt/GDP ratio while using 
certain coding, but they did not specify what kind of regression analysis they performed. For this 
thesis, the relationship between public debt and GDP for both advanced and emerging markets will 
be determined. This will be examined by performing a multitude of regression analyses. It was 
desirable to replicate Reinhart and Rogoff’s thesis using the methodologies of Herndon, Ash and 
Pollin, but unfortunately that might be very complicated as finding the exact data needed might be 
difficult and it could be difficult to code everything exactly as Herndon, Ash and Pollin did. 
The observations were to include all of the countries used between the papers of Reinhart 
and Rogoff, and Herndon, Ash and Pollin. They used 40 countries (20 advanced and 20 emerging) 
and analyzed their public debts and GDP growth rates for years dating back to 1790 up to 2009 
with some data for 2010. They then created five groups based on how much public debt was a 
certain percentage of a country’s GDP. This thesis ideally is to update the debt/GDP ratio for the 
years 2010-2017.  
Here, regression analyses will be conducted. Numerous models will be formed, including 
models depicting the direct relationship between public debt and GDP. Advanced and emerging 
economies cannot be analyzed at the same standards; the literatures noted depict debt/GDP ratios 
calculated for both advanced and emerging countries separately as opposed to being grouped. 
Thus, dummy variables need to be formed for advanced and non-advanced economies. As public 
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and private debt are polarizing variables, they will not be included in a model together; this extends 
to the intentionally separation of public debt and household debt as well. Since household debt is 
a subsection of private debt, these variables will also not be calculated simultaneously. The aim is 
to prove whether more public/private debt types will lead to growth increasing/decreasing at 
different rates. Thus, quadratic models are necessary for this analysis; all debt types will be 
collected as both normal and squared. Total population for each selected country will be included 
in almost every model as well as total investment to analyze how much these variables influence 
the statistical significance of the debt variables. Total investment will be marked as a ratio of total 
investment in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. This considers investment 
from both the government and all corporations for each country. The Investment data is calculated 
by the aggregate value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and 
acquisitions excluding removals of valuables for a unit or sector (IMF 2019). It will be measured 
as a percentage of the country’s GDP for each year. The variables data for the regression analysis 
would be labelled as followed: 
 
• Real GDP growth for both advanced and emerging economies (y-variable) 
• Public debt for both advanced and emerging economies  (x-variable) 
• (Public debt)2 for both advanced and emerging economies  (x-variable) 
• Private debt for both advanced and emerging economies  (x-variable) 
• (Private debt)2 for both advanced and emerging economies  (x-variable) 
• Household debt for both advanced and emerging economies (x-variable) 
• (Household debt)2 for both advanced and emerging economies (x-variable) 
• Total population for both advanced and emerging economies (x-variable) 
• Total investment for both advanced and emerging economies (x-variable) 
• Inflation rate for both advanced and emerging economies  (y-variable) 
 
The Real GDP growth for both advanced and emerging markets will be the dependent variables 
while all the public debt categories will serve as the independent variables for this analysis. These 
groups will be constructed in the long run. Public, private and household debt are calculated as a 
percentage of their country’s GDP. The population dataset was measured as millions of people 
until it was decided to multiply each data by a million to not get it confused as a percentage 
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representation for STATA. Total investment is measured as a percent of GDP and inflation is 
measured as annual percent change. All data was collected from the International Monetary Fund. 
To recap, the main part of this thesis was to conduct an analysis of the relationship between 
real GDP growth and different types of debt (public, private and household). This paper was to 
initially include the 40 countries used between the papers of Reinhart and Rogoff, and Herndon, 
Ash and Pollin; 20 of these countries were advanced and 20 were emerging. They created five 
groups based on how much public debt was a certain percentage of a country’s GDP (this is still 
planned). The plan was to update the debt/GDP ratio for the years 2010-2017. However, after 
finally gathering the data, some of the countries do not have data yet for variables such as private 
debt or household debt. In addition, some of these countries did not have data on its public debt 
for 2016-2017 yet. Ultimately, this paper collected data on real GDP growth, public, private and 
household debt, population, total investment and inflation. Not many countries have this data for 
2016 and 2017 yet so to ensure there are enough observations, the data was collated for the years 
2010-2015. The countries selected were countries that had data on all of these variables for the 
determined years; if one country had public and private debt information but no household debt 
for the selected years, that country would be excluded. Finally, 57 countries will be used in this 
paper – some of these countries were used in the referenced papers but most were countries 
excluded by Reinhart and Rogoff. In total, there are 342 observations in this experiment. 
Reinhart and Rogoff simply stated that they used government and external debt, without 
going into further detail of how they’re defining these variables. This paper defines government 
debt variable as general government debt recorded from the International Monetary Fund. The 
IMF defines this variable as “the total stock of debt liabilities issued by the general government as 
a share of GDP. Citation: Global Debt (2018). The private debt variable is comprised of private 
debt, loans and debt securities. The household debt variable is similarly compiled of household 
debt, loans and securities. The IMF defines private debt variable as ‘total stock of loans and debt 
securities issued by households and nonfinancial corporations as a share of GDP.’ Citation: Global 
Debt (2018). Likewise, the household debt variable is defined by the IMF as ‘total stock of loans 
and debt securities issued by households as a share of GDP.’ Citation: Global Debt (2018). All of 
these variables are measured as a percentage of a county’s GDP for each year. The GDP dependent 
variable is also measured in annual percent changes.  
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It was advisable to start small and conduct simple population regressions first. Numerous 
models will still be formed, including quadratic models depicting the direct relationship between 
public debt and GDP. To start conducting regression trials, eight simple models were constructed 
to test real GDP and debt: a model depicting the relationship between GDP growth and public 
debt, population and total investment, a model calculated the effects private debts, population and 
total investment growths on real GDP growth, and a model analyzing GDP and household debt 
with population and total investment. To test direct relationships between growth and the debt 
variables, models will be constructed excluding the population and investment variables. Since 
“advanced” and “non-advanced” countries were treated differently in the literatures, dummy 
variables have to be constructed and then variables that calculate the interactions between the 
dummy variables and the different types of debt. Everything needs to start small; thus, models 
depicting the types of debt for each country is classified as linear as opposed to being in polynomial 
forms for now.  
 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where 𝛽1 is the unknown population parameter for each variable (𝛽0 is the intercept of the 
regression line with the y-axis), 𝜀 is the population error. These models and all subsequent models 
will be both a time series data and a cross sectional data or a panel dataset. This whole analysis is 
to update and contribute to the works of Reinhart and Rogoff as well as Herndon, Ash and Pollin. 
The date for this thesis will be created; the data that was conducted between the two core papers 
will not be touched. 
Dummy = 1 if the country is deemed as “advanced” by the IMF (2016) and Dummy = 0 if 
the country was not indicated as such by the IMF. Typically, the interaction between the debt and 
the dummy variables would be analyzed in conjunction with the other variables. However, this 
could complicate the models as there are already numerous variables considered; the interaction 
variables, otherwise known as the slope dummy variables, could start influencing the other 
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variables the point where their outcomes would no longer be statistically significant. As a result, 
these slope dummy variables will not be considered in any of the constructed models in this thesis. 
After recalling that Reinhart and Rogoff also examined the relationship between public 
debt and inflation, data on inflation rates using average consumer prices and their annual percent 
changes was collected, with the IMF as the source. Reinhart and Rogoff concluded that there was 
no real relationship between these two variables. Citation: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). However, 
their research was disproved by Herndon, Ash and Pollin and they didn’t replicate this part of the 
initial paper. Another thing to consider is that this relationship was tested for years prior to those 
included in this data. Hopefully, there is indeed a relationship between these two variables had 
Reinhart and Rogoff implemented their data correctly and continued their research. Thus, the fifth 
model was constructed to see if a definite relationship between public debt and real GDP ultimately 
exists with the dummy variable and interaction. Thus, the initial models for the inflation/public 
debt relationship and connection between inflation and public debt, population, as well as 
investment was formed as followed:  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff discussed in one of their papers that private debts from the banking 
sectors migrated to the public sector and transformed into public debt. Citation: Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011). They did not, however, analyze the relationship between GDP growth and private 
debt itself. It would be very interesting to examine what kind of relationship these two variables 
have with each other. The same will be done for household debt and GDP. As such, the variables 
will be labelled as identical to the ones outlined for public debt/GDP relationship but this time it 
will be for private debt and household debt.  
Reinhart and Rogoff claimed that public debt had little to no impact on inflation for 
advanced countries and inflation rose when public debt rose. However, this was when they 
conducted many coding errors as pointed out by Herndon, Ash and Pollin. They did not test the 
relationship for debt and inflation themselves. For this thesis, there will be no model testing the 
relationship between inflation and private debt or household debt.  
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The first two figures show the trends in each variable for the countries Albania and USA, 
an emerging economy and an advanced country, respectively. Not surprisingly, real GDP growth 
had declined from 2010-2015 and public debt increased simultaneously for Albania. Growth faced 
a rapid decline until 2014 when growth began to increase but at a lower level compared to 2010. 
During this time, public debt continued to increase. As a developing country faced increasing 
public debts, the GDP growth rate declined in the long run. On the other side, however, GDP 
growth has fluctuated in the US while public debt continuously rose. This almost goes in line with 
the hypotheses of this paper. There doesn’t appear to be a linear relationship between GDP growth 
and any of the debt categories, but further testing is essential to confirm these assumptions. 
Based on reading the literatures regarding each variable, many predictions have been made: 
As more public debt increases for advanced countries, GDP growth will continue to rise until 
public debt reaches levels above 120% of a country’s GDP and then decline. For non-advanced 
countries, public debt will continue to be detrimental to economic growth. Private debt will have 
negative consequences on GDP growth for both advanced and non-advanced countries if they 
continue to increase. Similar hypotheses can be conjectured regarding household debt and growth; 
as household debt is a subsection of private debt, it will negatively impact GDP growth for both 
advanced and emerging economies. As public debt negatively affected inflation historically in the 
U.S., an advanced country, public debt should continue to raise inflation for both advanced and 
emerging economies. However, it should be stated clearly that the United States is a unique 
economy where it can print more money and distribute the U.S. dollar to foreign countries without 
depreciating the dollar value. This country is unique, and it should be noted that it will still be 
regarded at the same standard as another advanced country such as Spain in this analysis, despite 
the economic differences between these two economies. 
The Gauss Marko Theorem states that if all classical assumptions are true, then OLS estimates 
are Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE). The classical assumptions include assumptions of 
population errors having a normal PDF (i.e. there are at least 30 estimates in a population 
regression function), the errors being homoscedastic and the lack of a linear relationship among 
the independent variables (no multicollinearity). To test to see if my OLS estimates are BLUE, the 
following robustness checks must be conducted: 
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• Test for multicollinearity 
• Hausman Test 
 
Before any regression can be conducted, these two tests must be completed first to ensure the 
variables are BLUE. Since the dataset is both a cross section and a time series, the Hausman test 
must be used here.  
 
 
Section IV: Robustness Checks 1 
Initial Tests for Multicollinearity 
After running regression tests on GDP and the eight models, for public debt and GDP, no 
R2 value was calculated above 0.35; these are not high values and thus there is no imperfect 
multicollinearity present in this model. When analyzing the values of the vifs for each model, they 
were all below the value of 5 as seen in Table 2. The results are displayed in table 2 at the bottom 
of this thesis. Interestingly, when the population and investment variables were coupled with the 
debt and dummy variables, the debt variables received higher vifs that risked imperfect 
collinearity. When the model would only include growth/inflation and the different debt and 
dummy variables, the vifs for the debt variables only decreased to equal the dummy variable for 
each “simplified model”. The dummy variables would remain unchanged with their respective 
debt models. There is no sign of imperfect multicollinearity with any these models. Hopefully, the 
initial hausman tests will reveal no bias either and determine whether to use the fixed effects or 
random effects model for each equation. 
 
Initial Hausman Tests 
The Hausman tests revealed peculiar results as evidenced in Table 3; all of the p-values for 
each variable for each model were lower than the level of significance for the two-tail test (2.5 
percent). Naturally, the fixed effects models should be selected. However, each time the fixed 
effects models were plugged in, the dummy variables were omitted because of collinearity. Could 
the dataset be more biased than perceived when the tests for multicollinearity were conducted? 
Whenever the random effects models were tested, however, all of the variables were accounted for 
and not omitted. Ideally, the fixed effects model should be selected for these regressions. To get 
Po 
 
 23 
around this conundrum, there should be dummy variables implemented for every country (or 
country code) to eliminate collinearity. 57 new dummy variables were generated to account for 
each country used in this dataset. After these new dummy variables were generated, no variables 
were omitted, and the p-values were still lower than the level of significance for the two-tail test. 
Thus, the fixed effects models could now be selected when running the regressions without any 
influences in the data. 
 
 
Section V: Initial Sample Regressions 
Initial Linear Models 
Model 1: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 2: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 3: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 4: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 5: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 6: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 7: 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 8: 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
The results of the estimates of the sample regression functions are illustrated in Tables 5 
and 6. The sample slope coefficients of each variable except for population, dummy and 
investment variables for models 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 respectively are significant. All of the debt 
variables were significant in each of their models. Almost all of the estimates followed 
expectations with the exception of the public debt variable. Public debt did negatively affect GDP 
by 0.6-0.9 percent for every 1 percentage point increase. However, the dummy variables indicated 
that advanced countries suffered growth drops greater than non-advanced countries by 0.95-4.6 
percent. The first percentage point, however, proves to be statistically insignificant so these results 
cannot accurately reflect the real differences between advanced and non-advanced countries. This 
could have to the fact that all of the variables are pooled together as opposed to being grouped in 
percentage brackets which would have been ideal. Another thing to consider is that some European 
countries fell into what was called the eurozone debt crisis after the Great Recession. Countries 
such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain that are deemed as “advanced economies” had 
their public as well as private debts accelerate, and GDP growths fluctuated greatly between each 
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country. Citations: Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011), Blundell-Wignall (2012). Some factors 
relating to this event are not accounted for in this thesis and this could result in the dummy 
negatively affecting real GDP growth for advanced countries to unprecedented levels despite 
established economic theories.  
On the flipside, private debt resulted in being detrimental to both country types by 0.04-
0.05 with the dummy variable significantly illustrating emerging economies suffering heavier 
losses of growth. Household debt similarly negatively affected real GDP growth as hypothesized 
(0.23-0.26), but some of the other variables are not significant, namely population. Interestingly, 
when household debt was coupled with population and investment, the dummy variable indicated 
advanced countries suffering less loss of growth with increasing debts compared to non-advanced 
countries. When these two variables were eliminated, however, the opposite occurred with the 
dummy variable while still being significant. While it is true that the population variable was never 
significant, the investment variable was significant. How much could investment have affected the 
dummy results between the two models? Hopefully when the debts are squared and added to the 
models, similar results will emerge but with more results being significant.  
Public debt did cause inflation to rise as expected; this makes sense as a country sometimes 
needs to monetize public debt to prevent the country becoming insolvent. Citation: Miller (1983). 
The dummy variable indicated that advanced countries face higher inflation when public debt 
increases. However, none of the dummy variable results were statistically significant. Thus, no 
conclusions can’t be drawn as to how the two country types differ when public debt affects 
inflation. R2 yields values anticipated for all models. Since there’s no multicollinearity in the 
regression models, each R2 is meant to have an appropriately low value; the goodness of fits of the 
models came as expected. It important to note that the investment variable produced beneficial 
results for countries’ growth rates.  
Up to this point, this analysis was based on linear models between the dependent and 
independent variables. The dataset was not yet grouped in the percentage brackets as outlined by 
Reinhart, Rogoff, Herndon, Ash, Pollin Kumar and Woo. After grouping and analyzing the data 
with this method, the majority of public debt was between 30-120 percent of a country’s GDP for 
advanced economies each year; few countries had public debt below 30 percent and above 120 
percent of GDP. For non-advanced economies, however, the majority of the datasets were between 
under 30 percent and 60 percent of GDP. Public debt was rarely higher than 85% of GDP and no 
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public debt was higher than 90 percent for each year. In order to regress the different debts and 
real GDP growth with this organization of the data, polynomial forms (or a quadratic models) and 
graphical models must be constructed. This means the new variable of (public debt)2 must be 
introduced to this thesis. It was mentioned by Fernald and Jones that population growth has slowed 
down in the recent decades, leading to slower growth; this could imply that a squared variable of 
total population for each country is possible to introduce. However, this could overcomplicate each 
formula and result in higher p-values for each variable, making them statistically insignificant. The 
same argument applies for the investment variable for similar reasons mentioned by Kumar and 
Woo. Thus, the only variables that will be both squared and linear are the debt variables. The 
models that will incorporate these new variables are outlined below: 
 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Similar to the simple linear models outlined earlier, there will still be eight models 
depicting both the direct relationships between growth/inflation and the different debt types and 
the relationships between these variables when investment and population are also considered. To 
ensure that all variables are still BLUE, the Hausman test must be conducted again with this new 
variable. The tests for multicollinearity are not necessary for these newly introduced variables as 
they are merely the debt variables squared. 
 
 
Section VI: Robustness Checks 2 
Second Hausman Tests 
The Hausman tests revealed similar results in Table 4 yielded from the previous tests; the 
p-value was lower than the level of significance for every two-tail test. Again, this should lead to 
the conclusion that the fixed effects model should be considered for the final regressions. However, 
Po 
 
 26 
the dummy variable was omitted again in each model because of collinearity. This didn’t happen 
when the random effects model was tested. Once again, to resolve this issue, the dummy variables 
for the country codes had to be used to eliminate collinearity. Similarly, the p-values were all lower 
than the level of significance with no variables being omitted. For the polynomial models, the fixed 
effects model will again be selected.  
 
 
Section VII: Final Regressions and Discussions 
Final Polynomial Forms 
 
Model 9: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 10: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 11: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 12: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 13: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 14: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 15: 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 16: 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 The results of the estimates from these regressions are listed in tables 7 and 8 and graphs 3 
and 4. The results were somewhat similar to the linear regressions. Again, public debt proved to 
be damaging to a country’s growth by 0.12-0.16 percentage points. Unfortunately, in both models, 
(public debt)2 proved to be statistically insignificant and showed positive results in growth. The 
dummy variables showed for advanced countries to be facing larger losses in growth as public debt 
increases while being insignificant in the first model but significant in the second model. How 
could advanced countries be suffering greater than non-advanced countries? Could it be because 
countries such as Spain, Ireland, Greece, Italy and Portugal faced debt levels higher than some 
emerging economies when they were facing the eurozone crisis? Could this economic event effect 
debt and growth enough for these results to be shown as calculated? Graph 3 illustrates how 
increasing public debt lowers growth until debt reaches about 90 percent of GDP that the decline 
rate begins to slow down. When debt reaches nearly 100 percent growth declines to zero percent 
and continuing debt results in negative growth. However, when debt nears 175 percent growth 
begins to increase again. If these values were significant and showed similar results, this violates 
the works of Herndon, Ash and Pollin as well as Kumar and Woo. They did not consider, however, 
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debt levels that would greatly surpass 120 percent of a country’s GDP, such as Japan facing 236 
percent public debt or Greece facing 180 percent during its sovereign debt crisis. It can almost be 
concluded that enough public debt could lead growth to increase. Ultimately, however, this 
analysis cannot definitively conclude that public debt would increase growth when it reaches past 
175 percent of GDP. 
Private debt, on the other hand, produced significant results for both of its models with 
private debt being harmful to growth with advanced countries suffering less than non-advanced 
countries. However, this was only true when debt wasn’t squared (-0.13 to -0.15 percentage 
points). When (private debt)2 was introduced in the model, this variable produced very small but 
positive quantitative results for growth in both models (0.00015-0.00016 percentage points). This 
is a similar predicament with the public debt variables. However, all of the variables with the 
exception of population were statistically significant, yielding more accurate results with private 
debt. Graph 4 displays comparable results as Graph 3 but with higher levels of private debt. Once 
private debt reaches approximately 130 percent of GDP, growth falls to zero and continues to 
decline until debt reaches to 450 percent of GDP. Similarly, with household debt, the polynomial 
models produced results with household debt yielding negative effects on growth initially but as it 
jumped quadratically household debt formed positive results; this was the case in both household 
models (-0.28 to -0.26 for regular and 0.00035 to 0.00032 for debt2). However, the squared variable 
of household debt was still insignificant statistically so this may not represent the actual 
relationship between growth and household debt. If that was the case, this would show opposite 
results of Lombardi and his [econometric] analysis of debt and growth. Household debt is supposed 
to be initially beneficial and then detrimental as debt continuously increases. Graph 5 illustrates 
growth declining almost completely linearly until household debt reaches to 150 percent of GDP 
where growth rises very little. How can private debt and household debt specifically be beneficial 
for growth as private debt increases? Could there be other economic factors hidden in these models 
that could account for positive growth when debt increases? Of course, this is analyzed in quadratic 
models as opposed to dummy groupings of different debt levels. This could also factor in the 
results produced.  
Investment was always positive in all of the models with the exception of inflation being 
the endogenous variable as evidenced in tables 6 and 8. This insignificance, combined with 
population facing insignificance concurrently, the public debt variables produced similar results 
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for inflation as the growth variable. Debt was harmful initially (0.17-0.15) but when squared (or 
elongated), negative coefficients formed (-0.00061 to 0.00063). However, when investment and 
population were eliminated in the next model, similar results were shown. Graph 6 shows inflation 
rising as public debt increases until it reaches over 120 percent of GDP. After 120 percent, inflation 
begins to decrease. This goes against the legal restrictions theory illustrated by Miller in 1983. It 
seems that public debt wouldn’t necessarily have as negative of an effect on inflation as 
hypothesized by Miller in 1983. It is obvious however that this was theorized 30 years ago; over 
time, the global economy has evolved drastically to endure countries facing higher levels of public 
debt and events such as the Great Recession and the eurozone crisis. Miller based his results on 
the economy that occurred in the 1980s which would no longer hold in 2015. It could be possible 
that the changes in the economic structure for many countries after 30 years could influence public 
debt having different effects on inflation in the 21st century. 
The variables must be controlled in each model and further testing may be required to 
figure out which variables to include/omit in the models to ensure more significant results. At this 
point, it can’t be concluded that increased public debt would lead to lower levels of economic 
growth for advanced countries and significant drops in growth for non-advanced countries. It also 
can’t be definitively concluded that more household debt would cause growth to rise or fall. 
Few limitations must be addressed when evaluating the econometric works of this thesis. 
What was ideal and brilliant about Kumar’s and Woo’s analysis was that they created dummy 
variables for their three groups of public debt levels. This paper merely produces a quadratic model 
to demonstrate how more public debt would lead to diminishing growth; this time, however, the 
public debt variable squared failed to be statistically significant in both models. This is a serious 
limitation when estimating how much public debt would cause growth to fall drastically.  
The biggest limitations, however, was the amount of the statistically insignificant results 
revealed when the regressions were conducted. In the linear models, the population and dummy 
variables were insignificant for many of the models while investment was insignificant only for 
the inflation experiment. When the polynomial models were calculated, population was 
insignificant for every model that included this variable. The public debt variable was also 
insignificant when it was squared. Due to these insignificant results, the graphs that were 
constructed produced figures that contradict the dominant theories of debt negatively affecting 
growth and stimulating inflation. In the graphs,  
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The main purpose of this thesis is to update the analysis of the different debt types and their 
effects on GDP growth/inflation since 2009 by Reinhart and Rogoff, Herndon, Ash and Pollin and 
Kumar and Woo. However, in their works they analyzed many countries over a span of decades 
whereas this thesis focuses only on six years. Each variable might not have had enough time to 
develop quantities that would lead to significant changes/results in their relationships with growth 
and inflation. Fernald and Jones concluded that population growth has declined in the years of 
their study, leading to similar declines in GDP growth. Citation: Fernald and Jones (2014). In this 
thesis, the year gap for the data is only six years compared to the 140+ year gap in their analysis. 
This thesis does not take into account the rate at which population, debt and investment growth 
increased/decreased for each country. This could be another limitation in the dataset. 
Because of these limitations, the results from these regressions revealed relationships that 
contradict the previous works/theories developed by the literatures mentioned in this thesis. Either 
these limitations influenced the data enough to produce the results presented in the tables or the 
economic shocks between the sequential recessions since 2010 have caused the variables to relate 
differently with each other. 
 
 
Section VIII: Conclusions  
The econometric works depicted in this thesis yielded both statistically significant and 
insignificant results. Public debt insignificantly proved to be damaging to GDP for advanced 
countries by 0.12-0.16 percentage points for every percent increase in public debt. In the play of 
(public debt)2, however, results were insignificant with growth rising by 0.0003 percentage points. 
The dummy variable indicated advanced countries would face larger levels of decline in growth 
with increasing debt compared to non-advanced countries. This could be due to many advanced 
countries suffering from both the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis during the years 
selected. It can’t be concluded if increasing public debt would lead to higher/lower growth when 
debt reaches levels of over 120 percent of a country’s GDP. 
Private debt procured similar results as public debt for both private debt and (private debt)2, 
however results were significant for each model. The dummy variable indicated advanced 
countries would face smaller levels of decline in growth with increasing debt compared to non-
advanced countries. This leads to the conclusions that private debt could help growth very 
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minimally once private debt is over 400 percent of a country’s GDP. This would be true for only 
advanced countries; non-advanced countries would always face lower levels of growth when 
private debt increases. It can’t be concluded, however, that household debt would have 
positive/negative impacts on growth for all country types. Household debt may be harmful to 
growth initially, but it can’t be accepted/rejected that continuous increases in this debt type would 
lead to higher growth for either type of country.  
Public debt, however, proves to be risk inflation as this debt increases. However, once 
public debt surpasses 120 percent of GDP, inflation will begin to decline for advanced countries. 
This leads to the conclusion that if public debt is controlled in advanced countries, inflation will 
reach levels beneficial to their economy, depending on the economic state. 
It can’t be concluded whether increases in population is beneficial/harmful for growth and 
inflation based on these econometric works. Investment, however, should be encouraged amongst 
both advanced and non-advanced countries to boost economic growth. 
If this paper is to be revisited and revised for future works, new policy prescriptions must 
be implemented: One econometrician/researcher constructed this thesis with both significant and 
insignificant results; two authors for the revision of this thesis would be ideal for achieving only 
significant results. Selection of data will still have to come from credible sources such as the IMF 
but the exact data to be selected would be confirmed by all authors. The time gap for the years to 
be selected must be longer than the six years examined in this thesis. Most importantly, however, 
dummy variables to group the different debt types into appropriate debt levels is critical to 
determine the exact debt levels that would stimulate/harm GDP growth and inflation.  
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List of Graphs 
Figure 1: Debt-GDP Relationship for Albania, emerging market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Debt-GDP Relationship for USA, advanced market 
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Figure 3: Insignificant Relationship between Real GDP Growth and Public Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Significant Relationship between Real GDP Growth and Private Debt 
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Figure 5: Insignificant Relationship between Real GDP Growth and Private Debt 
 
 
Figure 6: Significant Relationship between Inflation and Public Debt
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List of Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
RGDP 
Growth 
(annual 
percent 
change) 
InflationR 
(annual 
percent 
change) 
%pubdebt 
(percent 
of real 
GDP) 
%privdebt 
(percent 
of real 
GDP) 
%housedebt 
(percent of 
real GDP) 
population 
(measured in 
millions * 
1,000,000) 
 
%invest 
(percent 
of 
GDP) 
 
%pubdebt2 
(percent of 
real GDP)2 
%privdebt2 
(percent of 
real GDP)2 
%housedebt2 
(percent of real 
GDP)2 
Years 
2010-
2015 
2010-
2015 
2010-
2015 
2010-
2015 
2010-2015 2010-2015 
2010-
2015 
2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
Mean 2.73 59.40 137.53 49.88 2.86 80533350.88 22.83 5078.46 26541.70 3589.39 
Variance 10.20 1554.60 7650.53 1104.94 12.82 
5798862475
864500 
30.60 
63952629.5
9 
120430609
0.02 
18544742.20 
Sample 
Size 
342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 
 
 
Table 2: Calculation of Variance Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 
(model 1) 
VIF 
(model 2) 
VIF 
(model 3) 
VIF 
(model 4) 
VIF 
(model 5) 
VIF 
(model 6) 
VIF 
(model 7) 
VIF 
(model 8) 
%pubdebt 1.50 1.21     1.50 1.21 
%privdebt   1.81 1.72     
%housedebt     1.86 1.75   
population 1.99  1.78  1.79  1.99  
%invest 2.29  1.92  1.88  2.29  
dummy 1.21 1.21 1.72 1.72 1.77 1.75 1.21 1.21 
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Table 3: Results of Initial Hausman Tests 
Variable H0 HA 
Level of 
Significance 
Chi2 Prob. > Chi2 
Model 1 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 9.69 0.0079 
Model 2 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 12.87 0.0003 
Model 3 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 21.79 0.0000 
Model 4 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 20.31 0.0000 
Model 5 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 71.39 0.0000 
Model 6 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 75.73 0.0000 
Model 7 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 7.47 0.0239 
Model 8 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 5.23 0.0222 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Second Hausman Tests 
Variable H0 HA 
Level of 
Significance 
Chi2 Prob. > Chi2 
Model 9 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 11.66 0.0086 
Model 10 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 13.22 0.0013 
Model 11 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 47.86 0.0000 
Model 12 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 45.18 0.0000 
Model 13 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 71.80 0.0000 
Model 14 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 76.26 0.0000 
Model 15 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 13.08 0.0045 
Model 16 
Difference in coefficients 
not systemic (FE = RE) 
Difference in coefficients 
are systemic (FE ≠ RE) 
5% 9.63 0.0081 
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Table 5: Testing the Effects of Debt Types to GDP Growth with Linear Forms 
 Model 
1 
P-Value 
Model 
2 
P-Value 
Model 
3 
P-Value 
Model 
4 
P-Value 
Model 
5 
P-Value 
Model 
6 
P-Value 
Dep Var 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 
cons 
 
-2.785 
(3.321) 
0.402** 
8.867 
(1.681) 
0.000** 
-4.146 
(2.420) 
0.088** 
6.357 
(1.548) 
0.000** 
1.350 
(2.343) 
0.565** 
22.742 
(2.083) 
0.000** 
%𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.059 
(0.019) 
0.003** 
-0.092 
(0.017) 
0.000**         
%𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
    
-0.038 
(0.008) 
0.000** 
-0.047 
(0.008) 
0.000**     
%ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
        
-0.234 
(0.026) 
0.000** 
-0.263 
(0.026) 
0.000** 
dummy 
-0.945 
(1.791) 
0.598** 
-4.600 
(1.762) 
0.010** 
15.186 
(3.345) 
0.000** 
0.150 
(1.457) 
0.918** 
22.661 
(3.050) 
0.000** 
-12.975 
(1.728) 
0.000** 
%𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
0.300 
(0.081) 
0.000**   
0.353 
(0.072) 
0.000**   
0.263 
(0.067) 
0.000**   
population 
-1.70e 
(2.88e) 
0.556**   
-6.40e 
(2.83e) 
0.822**   
-6.06e 
(2.60e) 
0.816**   
N 342  342  342  342  342  342  
2R  0.610  0.589  0.623  0.591  0.683  0.665  
Chi2 9.69  12.87  21.79  20.31  71.39  75.73  
Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 All standard errors are in parentheses 
 * indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
 ** indicates significance at 5% level of significance 
 *** indicates significance at 1% level of significance 
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Table 6: Testing the Effects of Public Debt to Inflation with Linear Forms 
 Model 7 P-Value Model 8 P-Value 
Dep Var 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 
cons 
 
-4.827 
(4.281) 
0.260** 
-0.926 
(2.069) 
0.655** 
%𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡  
 
0.060 
(0.024) 
0.015** 
0.046 
(0.022) 
0.038** 
dummy 4.002 
(2.309) 
0.084** 
3.149 
(2.234) 
0.160** 
%𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
0.117 
(0.105) 
0.266**   
population -6.92e 
(3.72e) 
0.064**   
N 342  342  
R2 0.484  0.474  
Chi2 7.47  5.23  
Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
All standard errors are in parentheses 
 * indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
 * indicates significance at 5% level of significance 
 * indicates significance at 1% level of significance 
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Table 7: Testing the Effects of Debt Types to GDP Growth with Polynomial Forms 
 Model 
9 
P-Value 
Model 
10 
P-Value 
Model 
11 
P-Value 
Model 
12 
P-Value 
Model 
13 
P-Value 
Model 
14 
P-Value 
Dep Var 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 
cons 
 
0.0015 
(3.6885) 
1.000** 
11.8452 
(2.2399) 
0.000** 
-1.2089 
(2.4215) 
0.618** 
17.8199 
(2.8584) 
0.000** 
15.6126 
(3.9503) 
0.000** 
22.9081 
(3.1767) 
0.000** 
%𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.1215 
(0.0414) 
0.004** 
-0.1632 
(0.0407) 
0.000**         
%𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
    
-0.1388 
(0.0231) 
0.000** 
-0.1513 
(0.0236) 
0.000**     
%ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
        
-0.2853 
(0.0716) 
0.000** 
-0.2677 
(0.072) 
0.000** 
dummy -2.9854 
(2.1463) 
0.165** 
-6.9826 
(2.1447) 
0.001** 
26.9489 
(4.1089) 
0.000** 
17.2727 
(2.5438) 
0.000** 
11.1167 
(2.7862) 
0.000** 
-13.0475 
(2.0211) 
0.000** 
%𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
0.2921 
(0.0815) 
0.000**   
0.3426 
(0.0700) 
0.000**   
0.2742 
(0.0689) 
0.000**   
population -1.61e 
(2.88e) 
0.575**   
9.73e 
(2.76e) 
0.724**   
-2.78e 
(2.63e) 
0.916**   
%𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2  0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.088** 
0.0004 
(0.0002) 
0.055**         
%𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2  
    
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
0.000** 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
0.000**     
%ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2  
    
 
 
   
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.448** 
0.0000 
(0.0004) 
0.945** 
N 342  342  342  342  342  342  
2R  0.6140  0.5946  0.6505  0.6206  0.6842  0.6657  
Chi2 11.66  13.22  47.86  45.18  71.80  76.26  
Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 All standard errors are in parentheses 
 * indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
 ** indicates significance at 5% level of significance 
 *** indicates significance at 1% level of significance 
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Table 8: Testing the Effects of Public Debt to Inflation with Polynomial Forms 
 Model 15 P-Value Model 16 P-Value 
Dep Var 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 
cons 
 
-9.8192 
(4.7312) 
0.039** 
-5.3024 
(2.8343) 
0.062** 
%𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡  
 
0.1732 
(0.0531) 
0.001** 
0.1507 
(0.0515) 
0.04** 
dummy 7.6561 
(2.7531) 
0.006** 
6.650 
(2.7139) 
0.015** 
%𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 
0.1327 
(2.7531) 
0.206**   
population -7.08e 
(3.69e) 
0.056**   
%𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2  -0.0006 
(0.0002) 
0.017** 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.026** 
%𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2      
%ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2      
N 342  342  
R2 0.4948  0.4836  
Chi2 13.08  9.63  
Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
All standard errors are in parentheses 
 * indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
 * indicates significance at 5% level of significance 
 * indicates significance at 1% level of significance 
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